Economy Of Pakistan

Project Ideas for Economics 415 Professor Peter Cramton
Spectrum Auctions
• The FCC is going to begin using combinatorial bidding (or package bidding) in the 700 MHz auction. When does package bidding make sense? Compare and contrast the strategic factors in the FCC’s standard simultaneous ascending auction and in the simultaneous ascending auction with package bidding. The 3G auctions in Europe have raised over $100 billion. Many telcos and equipment manufacturers are concerned that this is sucking much needed capital from the industry. What is their concern? Does it make economic sense? What is a good solution to the problem? In the recent C&F block reauction, most of the licenses were won by bidding fronts that were owned by the six largest wireless operators. Is this a problem? What can the FCC do to mitigate this problem? The US is in need of spectrum to offer 3G services. What options are available? How can additional spectrum best be found and cleared of any incumbents? In Europe, there has been a debate about whether to us auctions to assign spectrum licenses or beauty contests. Comment on the debate. What are the pros and cons of both? What would you recommend? Does a beauty contest every make sense? If so, how should it be structured? C-block auction winners are having a difficult time raising capital on Wall Street. Most of the major winners defaulted. What are the difficulties with defaults? Why may this happen? What can the FCC learn for future auctions? The DEF auction was the largest to date in terms of number of licenses (nearly 1500). Prices were low. Why? Did the small business F-block bidders bid on the DE blocks? Was there evidence of “splitting up the pie without using price”? Were punishment strategies used? Why did we see all the withdrawals? Were they part of nice punishments or for some other purpose? Some of the large bidders in the C-block auction had questionable financing (NextWave) or ownership structures (NorthCoast). What effect.